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Port Trucking as a Test Case of
Precarious Work in the Grey Zone of
Work and Employment
Le camionnage dans les ports, un cas type de travail précaire dans la zone grise
du travail et de l’emploi
David H. Bensman
1 In the grey zone of work and employment, rules and standards are often unclear (Azais,
2014) Is a worker an employee or a contractor? If he/she is an employee, various labor
and employment laws regulate working conditions. If s/he is a contractor, s/he is free
to do work on behalf of anyone who will sign an agreement. That relationship should be
regulated by commercial  law. In most industrialized countries,  workers enjoyed job
rights “that included decent wages, protections against unfair treatment at work, social
insurance  provided by  the  state  or  the  employer  and,  notably,  some degree  of  job
security.  These  rights  comprised  what  many  describe  as  the  standard  employment
relationship.”  (Stone  &  Arthurs,  2013,  p. 2)  Today,  that standard  employment
relationship  has  been  disrupted,  and  the  boundary  separating  employment  from
contracting is grey. Is the job permanent or temporary? When is a contractor truly
independent?  Should  contractors  who  are  dependent  be  reclassified  as  employees?
Should contractors have the right to engage in collective action? Should a new category
of  dependent  contractor  be  enshrined  in  law,  with  distinct  responsibilities  and
opportunities, as is the case in some Canadian provinces, Italy and Spain? (Cherry &
Aloisi, 2016)
2 These questions are vexing workers,  employers,  companies,  lawyers,  regulators and
judges all over the world as companies seek ways to focus on their core competences,
reduce  costs,  and  gain  flexibility,  while  workers  seek  security  and  freedom,
opportunities for profit and public service, paths to profit and to work-life balance.
Technological advances inspire dreams of opportunity while at the same time offering
means for surveillance and micromanagement. 
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3 Nowhere  is  the  ambiguity  of  emerging  work  relationships  around  the  world  more
pronounced than in the port trucking (drayage) sector of the trucking industry.1 In the
US and Australia, many drivers who used to be employees now work as independent
contractors.2 (Bensman,  2009;  Quinlan,  Mayhew & Johnstone,  2006)  In the EU,  most
truckers are employees, not contractors, but labor standards are decreasing rapidly,
and many Eastern European workers are entering the labor force in response to the
European  Commission’s  ongoing  pressure  on  the  original  EU  member  nations  to
dismantle  their  national  regulatory  regimes  in  favor  of  a  more  liberal  EU  system.
(Sayer, 2016; Bayliss, 1998)
4 In response to these changes, unions in the US, Australia, and the original EU member
countries  have  adopted  a  range  of  strategies  to  raise  standards.  In  the  US,  the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters is challenging the trucking companies’ use of
independent contractors. (Bensman, 2009; Bensman, 2014b) In Australia, the Transport
Workers’  Union  has  campaigned  for  a  Safe  Rates  national  policy  to  force  trucking
companies  to  raise  rates  high  enough  to  reduce  accidents  by  discouraging  unsafe
driving practices. (Kaine & Rawling, 2012) In Europe, unions in the original EU member
countries and their unions have begun EU-wide as well as national campaigns to raise
standards, using the Australian truckers’ campaign as a model. (Sayer, 2016; European
Transport Workers Federation, 2015) While the unions are conducting these campaigns
with varying degrees of success in these diverse regions, some workers are resisting
regulation or expressing ambivalent feelings about whether they would be better off as
employees with legal rights, as contractors in business for themselves, or as some new
category of worker with a mixture of the rights and responsibilities of workers and of
independent businessmen. (Dubai, 2017)
5 In its first section, this article will describe the process of deregulation in the three
regions. The second section will compare how these “grey zone” workers are put to
work in countries which have divergent political institutions and legal systems. The
third section will compare what the union campaigns have been able to accomplish in
terms of gaining stronger legal protections and access to social insurance, raising pay
standards of compensation and improving working conditions, and/or enhancing the
truckers’ ability to engage in collective action. The conclusion will:
 
1. Drayage and the Trucking Industry
6 In most of the world, trucking is an industry afflicted with destructive competition. In
2006,  Australia’s  Dr.  Michael  Quinlan,  the  world’s  leading  scholar  on  trucking’s
occupational  health  and  safety,  along  with  two  colleagues,  surveyed  the  existing
literature on road freight transport and concluded that:
In most industrialized countries {competition in} road transport … has intensified
to  the  point  where  there  are  strong  inducements  to  employ  exploitive  work
arrangements and evade or avoid minimum regulatory standards.  These include
subcontracting  work  to  low-cost  owners/drivers  and  paying  employee  drivers
minimal wages based on driving time (and using immigrants in the case of Europe
and the US) The implications of this for safety are becoming increasingly clear….”
(Quinlan, Mayhew & Johnstone, 2006, p. 60) 
7 This was not always the case. Trucking was deregulated in the US in 1981 (Bensman
2009) In Australia, the rapid expansion of international trade during the Second World
War overwhelmed the national regulatory regime and devolved most regulation to the
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state level. When a National Road Transport Commission was established in 1991 as the
product of  a  neo-liberal  economic agenda,  it  aimed at  facilitating freight flows and
declined to enact national legislation to protect worker health and safety. (Quinlan et
al., 2006) In the European Union, the industry used to be regulated by national regimes,
which established rules for competition by freight transport companies and protected
the  working  conditions  and  health  and  safety  of  drivers  on  the  road  throughout
Europe, but as the Union liberalized trade in the 1980s,  it  began putting in place a
Union-wide structure which decreased enforcement of transnational transport. (Sayer,
2016; Bayliss, 1998) 
 
2. Deregulating Trucking
8 In the United States, the bill that deregulated the trucking industry, The Federal Motor
Carrier Act of 1980, was enacted at a time when neoliberal policy was picking up steam.
Its passage was hailed by liberals and the business community alike as a triumph of
policy reform. Senator Ted Kennedy and Ralph Nader led the reformers who charged
that  trucking regulation meant  high rates  for  consumers  and monopoly  profits  for
businesses. Large shippers lobbied Congress for an end to the rate setting and route
planning which limited competition and drove up the cost of freight transport. (Robyn,
1987) Civil rights organizations argued that deregulation would lower the barriers that
impeded  African-Americans  from  gaining  a  just  share  of  decent  trucking  jobs.
(Heywood & Peoples, 1994)
9 Despite  these  high hopes,  deregulation wrecked the  drayage  industry.  Before  1980,
trucking companies had to get a license from the Interstate Commerce Commission to
haul freight to and from the ports.  The ICC limited the number of trucks to assure
stability;  the  resulting  rate  structure  was  sufficient  for  companies  to  make  stable
profits while providing workers with decent incomes with benefits. The International
Brotherhood of Teamsters organized and bargained for most of the port truckers, who
received wage and benefit packages comparable to those of autoworkers, steelworkers,
and over-the-road truckers. (Belzer, 2000; Belman & Monaco, 2001; Viscelli, 2016.)
10 All  this  changed  with  deregulation.  New  drayage  companies  entered  the  industry,
hiring their drivers on a non-union basis. Established companies faltered. Some went to
non-union, others went out of business. The firms that triumphed established a new
business model, selling all or most of their trucks to the drivers, and then contracting
with them on a per-load basis to deliver containers from seaports to warehouses and
distribution  centers  and  vice  versa,  usually  within  a  seventy-five-mile  radius.  The
emerging  independent  contracting  model  meant  trucking  companies  had  few fixed
costs, bore no responsibility for workers’ compensation or unemployment insurance
fund  contributions,  paid  no  social  security  taxes,  and  were  able  to  obtain  drivers’
services without making contributions to health insurance or pension plans. (Bensman,
2009)
11 In Australia, the entry of large numbers of employee drivers occurred without formal
deregulation. The rapid growth of road freight during World War II caused a shortage
of  truck drivers  and pulled thousands of  employee drivers  into the freight  hauling
industry.  The  transport  companies  which  served  Australia  unusually  concentrated
retail industry themselves consolidated into a few large firms, which engaged hundreds
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of  employee  drivers  under  contracts  that  left  them  without  legal  protections  as
employees. (Bray & Rimmer, 1987, as cited in Kaine & Rawling, 2010, p. 189) 
12 In  Europe,  the  story  of  deregulation  is  more  complicated.  Great  Britain  privatized
deregulated  its  road  transport  sector  in  1968,  ending  a  post-war  nationalized  road
freight  system.  (Lawton-Smith,  n.d.)  Deregulation  was  carried  out  under  a  Labor
government  that  believed  that  the  market  would  more  efficiently  allocate
transportation  resources.  (Bayliss,  1998)  On  the  continent,  the  national  regulatory
regimes continued until 1985. (Bayliss, 1998) In that year, the European Court of Justice
ruled that the inland road sector should be opened to competition. In the same year,
the  European  Council  passed  the  Single  European  Act,  under  which  the  European
Commission  began  to  “create  an  international  intra-Union  transport  market  and
harmonise  operating  conditions  among  Member  States.”  (Bayliss,  1998,  p. 122)
Subsequently, France and Ireland began to deregulate its road transport sector in 1986,
Denmark in 1989, Belgium in 1991 and the Netherlands in 1994. Germany took limited
steps towards deregulation in 1994. (Bayliss, 1998)
13 The European Commission took responsibility for overseeing EU road transport market
at the same time that Europe’s international trade flows began to increase significantly.
Not only were imports to Asia and North America increasing, but in response to the
intensified  global  competition,  Western  European  manufacturers  were  shifting
production  rapidly  to  Eastern  European  sites  where  costs  and  wages  were  lower
(Huertgen, 2016) 
14 This  shift  in  trade  and  manufacturing  was  reinforced  by  the  impact  of  the  global
economic slowdown, which began in 2007. To cut costs, retailers began moving away
from  nationally  based  distribution  centers  to  create  logistics  chains  based  on  an
elaborate  system  of  subcontracting  that  brings  products  directly  from  suppliers  to
retail  stores.  Second,  transport  firms  began  subcontracting  work  in  these  logistics
chains to companies based in Eastern Europe, and Eastern European drivers began to
make up an increasing share of the labor force. As a result of these two changes, Sayer
argues that “Officially, a German haulier may be performing a distribution contract for
a multinational retailer, but often the Romanian or Bulgarian driver performing the
contract is separated from the multinational by up to ten layers of subcontracting”
(Sayer, 2016, p. 8)
15 The new EU regulatory system failed to keep up with the complex new logistics pattern.
While  they  continued  to  enforce  regulations  of  trucks  driving  within  national
boundaries, as they were required to do under the EC framework, this was a shrinking
segment  of  continental  freight  movement.  Indeed,  there  was  a  14%  reduction  in
domestic freight transport by volume during the years 2006-11. While domestic freight
movement was shrinking, the member states were overwhelmed by the complexity of
the  subcontracting  arrangements  in  transnational  freight  shipments,  and  did  not
create inspection regimes to ensure that the new entrants to the continental logistics
chain,  who  routinely  crossed  national  borders,  met  EU work  and  safety  standards.
While 95% of the freight transported in trucks between Western and Eastern Europe
was carried in trucks registered in Eastern Europe,  member states  rarely  inspected
these  tracks  on  the  road  or  in  their  depots.  (Sayer,  2016)  In  a  2014  report  to
stakeholders, the European Commission identified:
‘lack  of  enforcement  and  controls’  and  ‘illegal/unfair  employment  schemes
creating social  dumping’,  as the two most important issues facing the European
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road haulage industry…. The unsatisfactory enforcement of these provisions can be
traced back to the absence of binding provisions on the number and frequency of
checks… The lack of such provisions also creates difficulties for the Commission to
monitor  the  implementation  of  these  regulations.  (European  Commission,  2014,
p. 20, as cited in Sayer, 2016, p.5) 
16 This  brief  survey  has  demonstrated  that  the  path  to  the  deregulation  of  the  port
trucking  differed  in  the  regions  under  review.  In  the  US,  national  legislation
deregulated trucking in 1980 in order to spur competition and reduce road freight rates
as global trade accelerated. In Australia, regulation gave way during World War II, and
national  legislation  in  1991  formalized  trucking  liberalization.  The  European Union
began liberalizing transnational freight movement in 1985; in response, the regulatory
regimes of  the member countries  sharply reduced inspections of  trucks engaged in
cross-border  haulage.  While  the  paths  to  deregulation  differed,  the  result  in  each
region  was  that  trucking  in  general,  and  port  trucking  in  particular,  became  an
industry where drivers lost legal rights and protections.
 
3. The Impact of Deregulation on Truck Drivers 
17 In  the  United  States,  the  “independent  contractor”  arrangement  represents  the
outsourcing model used in drayage trucking (Bensman 2009, 2014a) Trucking firms --
rather than owning trucks and hiring workers as employees -- contract with drivers
who own or lease their vehicles. At the largest ports, Los Angeles and Long Beach, 86%
of the drivers were owner operators in 2003 (Monaco & Grobar, 2014) These drivers
work for, but are not officially employed by, one and only one trucking company, and
they are paid by the trip, rather than the hour. Contracting with owner-operators frees
trucking  companies  from  any  obligations,  they  would  incur  as  employers;  it  even
absolves them of responsibilities for worker health and safety and anti-discrimination
statutes. This “independent contractor” model,  while vulnerable to legal challenges,
served to enhance the trucking firms’ flexibility and reduced labor costs by at least
30%. (Bensman, 2014a) 
18 Further, and quite significantly, as an “independent business,” the owner operator is
prohibited  from  joining  with  other  owner  operators  to  act  collectively  to  improve
wages  and working conditions  through a  union or  a  business  association.  Doing so
would violate federal  antitrust  laws,  or  so most  industry participants  believe (Paul,
2016) 
19 Though the truck companies  categorize  these drivers  as  “independent  contractors”
when they file 1099 forms with the Internal Revenue Service, the owner operators are
essentially “dependent” contractors, who are not allowed to work for more than one
trucking firm, receive no employee benefits, are compensated by the trip rather than
the hour, and absorb all costs associated with the operation of their vehicles as well as
with the inefficiency of the system. The latter includes routine but costly delays and
bottlenecks (including terminal security clearance, dependence on terminal operations
to locate containers,  process  paperwork,  or  provide roadworthy chassis,  and traffic
congestion) For owner operators, who are paid by the trip, wait time is one of the most
significant factors impacting compensation, contributing to the extended hours of the
workday,  and generating health-draining levels  of  stress  (Monaco & Grobar,  2004;  ;
Bensman & Bromberg,  2008;  Hutson,  West,  & Wilke,  2007;  Port  Jobs,  2007;  East  Bay
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Alliance for a Sustainable Economy, 2007; Jaffee & Rowley, 2009; Smith, Bensman, &
Marvy,2010 ; DePillis, 2014) 
20 Overall,  drayage  owner-operators  work  in  a  labor  market  characterized  by  high
turnover, long working days, low earnings, the absence of employer-provided benefits,
poor  work  standards  and  entitlements,  and  high  exposure  to  injuries,  disease  and
psychological distress. The drivers are responsible for maintenance, repairs, fuel, tire
replacement,  road taxes,  insurance,  tolls,  traffic  fines,  radio and/or telephone bills,
truck leases and tax preparation (Port Jobs, 2007; East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable
Economy, 2007; Smith, Bensman, & Marvy, 2010 ) 
21 The drivers’ dependence on one firm limits the amount of work available to them to
cover expenses. According to a survey conducted at the port of Jacksonville, Florida by
Jaffee  and  Rowley  (2009),  98.1%  of  the  owner  operators  indicated  they  were  “not
allowed to  work  for  other  firms”.  Other  studies  report  similar  findings.  Therefore,
truckers  are  ‘misclassified’  as  independent  contractors  (Bensman,  2014a;  Smith,
Bensman & Marvy, 2010 ; Smith, Marvy & Zerolnick, 2014) While the drivers are strictly
overseen  by  corporate  managers  to  benefit  the  firms’  productivity  and  economic
advantage,  they  are  considered  ‘independent  owner  operators’  when  it  comes  to
benefits, worker rights, maintenance, and repairs. The misclassification of drivers as
“independent contractors” can be verified if  one applies the defining conditions for
employee classification to their labor market status. As outlined by Smith, Bensman
and Marvy,  these  conditions  include  “behavioral  control”,  “financial  control”,  and
“type of relationship”. (Smith, Bensman & Marvy, 2010.) Behaviorally, the contracting
firm determines what containers are moved, when and where, so there is no autonomy
or discretion. Financially, the firms set a price for the container move, and drivers have
no  independent  ability  to  determine  their level  of  compensation.  Finally,  drivers’
contracts  with  the  trucking  companies  permitted  to  move  containers  for  only  one
trucking company. These three conditions establish – as is demonstrated by repeated
rulings by California courts -- an absolute clear-cut case of the drivers’ misclassification
as “independent contractors”. (Smith, Marvy & Zerolnick, 2014) 
22 In addition to the economic consequences of the independent contractor arrangement,
the implications for the drivers’ health and safety deserve attention. (Quinlan, Mayhew
& Bohle, 2001; Quinlan & Bohle, 2009; Tompa, Scott-Marshall, Dolinschi,Trevithick, &
Bhattacharyya, 2007; Lewchuk, Clarke, & DeWolff, 2011) Trucking is classified as one of
the highest risk occupations in the US with “Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers”
having  the  highest  number  of  work  fatalities  of  any  occupation  (Bureau  of  Labor
Statistics,  2015)  Nearly  15  million  truck  drivers  are  susceptible  to  occupationally
induced health conditions (Apostolopoulos, Sönmez & Shattell,  2010), including high
morbidity and mortality rates associated with exposures to poor air quality and toxins
from prolonged exposure to diesel emissions; insufficient diets; limited availability of
nutritional  foods  available  in  truck  stops  and  gas  stations;  injuries  from accidents;
anxiety  and  stress  from  deadlines,  and  scheduling;  long  work  hours;  truck  repair
responsibilities’ traffic congestion and safety concerns; being sedentary in truck cabs
for long hours at a time; and unpaid wait times at ports, terminals and distribution
centers  (Williamson,  Bohle,  Quinlan,  &  Kennedy,  2009;  Apostolopoulos,  Sönmez  &
Shattell, 2010; Gonzalez, Minkler, Garcia, et al., 2011) 
23 As  owner  operators,  the  drivers  are  not  provided  with  health  insurance  by  their
employer  and  thus  may  lack  access  to  health  care.  More  than  two  thirds  of  port
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truckers  in  Houston,  Seattle  and  Jacksonville  reported  lacking  health  insurance
(Harrison, et al.; Port Jobs, 2007; Jaffee & Rowley, 2007, p. 9) Of the owner operators at
the New Jersey seaports who had health insurance, less than one percent received it
from their company. (Bensman &Bromberg, 2008)
 
4. Australia
24 During  the  years  1990-2010,  Australia’s  road  freight  transport  industry  became
increasingly  competitive,  as  retailers,  such  as  supermarket  chains,  increasingly
dominated the transport supply chain. (Quinlan, 2001; Rawling & Kaine, 2012) As their
bargaining power grew, they gained the ability to dictate transport prices,  delivery
requirements and penalties for failing to meet contract provisions on the transport
providers. These companies, in turn, reduced their own workforces and outsourced an
increasing share of their operations to small trucking fleets, which either did the work,
or subcontracted it to owner operators. As orders were moved down the supply chain,
the price per shipment declined while operating requirements tightened. The result
has  been  the  creation  of  a  fiercely  competitive  transport  market,  in  which  owner
operators  and  employees  of  small  fleet  operators  are  under  extreme  pressure  to
minimize their operating costs. A study done by a team led by Dr. Michael Quinlan for
the New South Wales government in 2001 found that this competitive market damaged
the  health  and  safety  of  the  drivers  and  endangered  public  safety.  (Quinlan,  2001)
Australian  employment  relations  scholars  Michael  Rawling  and  Sarah  Kaine
summarized the problem in a later journal article: 
The weight of  this  cumulative contractual  pressure induces intense competition
between employee drivers  and owner drivers  who frequently must  accept  work
terms and conditions dictated to them or fail to receive the work. Therefore drivers
are compelled to compromise on safety as they work longer hours, accept low
freight  rates  and  attempt  to  fulfill  unsustainable  delivery  timetables  ultimately
determined by the most powerful participants in the supply chain -- the clients.
Indeed, it has been found that the commercial dominance and influence of clients
results in unsafe payments and working conditions for truck drivers at the bottom
of the contracting chain. (Rawling & Kaine, 2012, p. 3)
25 Furthermore,  despite  reform  efforts,  these  problems  persisted  throughout  the
following decade. (Rawling & Kaine, 2012) 
26 The  Quinlan  report  found  that  in  order  to  stay  in  business,  drivers  skimped  on
maintenance, worked hours in excess of the 72-hour legal maximum, took stimulant
drugs to enhance alertness during their long hours of work, especially from midnight
to dawn, and drove at excessive speed. As a result, they were involved in many crashes,
some of them fatal to themselves or to other drivers. They also experienced chronic
injuries and high and prolonged levels of stress. (Quinlan, 2001) 
 
5. European Union
27 The changes  in  European trade  patterns,  logistics  practices  and regulatory  policies
combined to reduce wages and work standards and produce dangerous and unhealthy
industry  practices.  In  this  new world  of  subcontracted transport,  abuses  of  worker
safety and health abound, and national regulations intended to safeguard public safety
on the roads  are  rendered impotent.  As  a  result,  subcontracted truck drivers  from
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Eastern Europe now constitute a nomadic, illicit labor force in the European Union.
(Sayer, 2016) In England alone, 60,000 of them are currently driving trucks, out of a
labor force of 288,000. Thirty-three thousand of these drivers are contractors. (House of
Commons, 2016, p. 12) 
28 In continental  Europe,  standards have declined and regulation has faltered,  though
most of the truckers driving transnational routes are employees. In Denmark, a survey
of 235 truck drivers from Romania and Bulgaria conducted for the transportation union
and an employers’ association found that the truckers were employed by companies
registered  in  their  home  countries,  but  were  regularly driving  for  long  periods  in
Denmark, from which they often ventured to Germany and elsewhere in northwestern
Europe. Almost half had been away from their home countries for six weeks or more.
Almost all of them slept in their vehicles. While the drivers exclusively hauled freight
outside of their home countries, their employment contracts were based on Romanian
and  Bulgarian  laws  and  regulations.  (COFI,  2015)  A  2013  study  for  the  European
Parliament  concluded  more  generally  that  the  “harsh  and  often  uncontrolled
competition” of the road freight transport industry often pushed companies to deprive
drivers of social rights and to force them to drive longer hours at lower pay. (Sitran and
Pastori, 2013, p. 40) Indeed, the truckers’ low pay often forced to drive much longer
hours than national regulations permit. This put truckers, and those with whom they
shared the road, at risk of accidents due to fatigue and drug abuse. Furthermore, the
trucks provided by Eastern European subcontractors often didn’t meet the standards of
Western  European  regulators  for  brakes  and  tires.  Containers  carrying  hazardous
materials often ended up being hauled by untrained drivers with forged permits (Sayer,
2016) 
29 Several recent studies have found that working conditions for road freight haulers are
poor. In 2013, a study conducted for the European Parliament found that “there is a
widespread and shared agreement between stakeholders … about the fact that the road
freight  transport  sector  has,  for  several  years,  been  experiencing  a  considerable
deterioration of its working environment. (Sitran & Pastori, 2013, p.75) For example,
the study cited a report by a Belgian labor union on the condition of overnight parking
areas for drivers in the Flanders region, of whom the largest number were Poles. The
study found that because of overcrowding, 75% of the drivers were not able to find “a
suitable  place  to  park  their  lorries  and  were  forced  to  park  elsewhere.”  (Sitran  &
Pastori,  p. 61)  Another  study  found  that  eighty-eight  per  cent  of  truckers  from
Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia, who were driving in Denmark for extended periods,
slept in their trucks most nights. (COFI, 2015) Sayer found that a group of truck drivers
in the Netherlands cooked their meals on gas stoves on the side of the road, next to
their container trucks carrying flammable gases. The drivers often slept in their trucks
in places where they had no access to clean water. And at rest stops where there was
clean water, authorities often denied them to drink water, and charged high prices for
showers. Even when truckers stopped at facilities that were supposed to accommodate
them, they found that the toilets intended for their use were flooded, or that their
parking  slots  were  distant  from  sanitary  facilities  (Sayer,  2016;  also  see  House  of
Commons, 2016) 
30 Drivers in this new nomadic fleet often became ill. Drivers told Sayer that because of
the time pressure they felt  to make their deliveries within specified dates,  and the
financial pressure they felt because of their low rates of pay, and the limitations of the
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health coverage provided by their Eastern European companies, they often drove while
sick,  and  put  off  consulting  a  doctor.  Several  drivers  reported  that  they  knew  of
truckers who had died on the road as a result. Not surprisingly, Sayer reported, “labour
productivity in the land transport sector is lower than the total economy average, and
the lowest among all transport modes. In addition, it is the only mode in which labour
productivity is falling.” (Sayer, 2016, p. 11)
 
6. Labor Action
31 The  deteriorating  wages  and  working  conditions  of  truckers  has  spurred  union
organizing efforts and campaigns to enhance regulation in all  of  the regions under
consideration. In the US, to regulate when the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(IBT) began organizing port truckers in 1998,  its  challenges were many. First,  since
most  of  the drivers  worked  as  “independent  contractors,”  they  were  barred  from
joining a union under existing legal interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act.
(Bensman  2014a)  Furthermore,  the  industry  was  fragmented,  atomized,  and
competitive. Cost pressures compelled companies to squeeze their contracted drivers,
resulting in a race to the bottom with regard to wages and working conditions, and a
high rate of turnover among drivers. (Husing, Brightbill & Crosby, 2007) Scholars have
long regarded drayage as an industry highly resistant to union organization (Belzer,
2000; Belman & Monaco, 2001) But the organizing landscape is changing as organizers
have recognized the strategic importance of logistics for the larger economy. In 2005, a
Cornell University conference on global unionism included a panel on organizing in the
logistics industry, featuring representatives from the International Transport Workers’
global union federation. In the following two years, the Teamsters signed an agreement
with  the  Change  to  Win  Federation  to  partner  in  organizing  port  truckers.  In  the
beginning, the Teamsters/Change-to-Win campaign exerted political pressure on port
authorities  to  require  trucking  companies  hauling  freight  to  and  from  the  port  to
provide  emission-compliant  vehicles  and  employee  drivers.  The  latter  provision  –
known as the “employee mandate” – would, proponents argued, reduce the number of
owner-operators, increase the number of employee drivers, provide them with greater
economic  compensation  and  security,  and  make  it  legal  for  them  to  organize  a
union.This campaign was launched in several ports. The Coalition for Clean and Safe
Ports -- joining together labor, environmental, environmental justice, community, and
faith-based  organizations  --  established  a  presence  in  Long  Beach/Los  Angeles,
Oakland, Portland, Seattle/Tacoma, Miami, and Newark/Elizabeth. It developed most
fully in Los Angeles/Long Beach, where the Los Angeles Association for a New Economy,
the  National  Resource  Defense  Council,  the  Long  Beach  Alliance  for  Children  with
Asthma  and  the  Southern  California  Environmental  Health  Sciences  Center  proved
effective partners. Organizing under the banner of improving air quality and improving
public health in port-adjacent communities, the Coalition enlisted the support of local
politicians, including L.A. Harbor Commissioner Janice Hahn, who later was elected to
the County Board of Supervisors and then to the US Congress, and Los Angeles Mayor
Ramon Villaraigosa. (Jaffee & Bensman, 2016) In October 2008, the campaign achieved
success  when  the  Los  Angeles  Harbor  Commission  adopted  a  Clean-Truck  Program
which required trucking companies that operated at the port to provide trucks that
met emissions standards, and which mandated the companies to employ the drivers
working for them. Implementation was soon halted, however,  by a court injunction
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lawsuit  filed  by  the  American  Trucking  Association.  A  federal  appeals  court  struck
down the employee mandate in 2011, ruling that it was pre-empted by federal maritime
regulations.  The ruling meant that  the Coalition had to adopt a  different strategy.3
(Jaffee & Bensman, 2016) 
32 The union strategy shifted to attacking the drayage industry’s business model, which
was  based  on  the  misclassification  of  its  labor  force  as  “independent  contractors.”
When the IBT/Change to Win alliance had been announced,  this  strategy had been
rejected by union officers on the grounds that proving misclassification in court would
be  time-consuming  and  expensive,  because  each  lawsuit  alleging  violation  of
employment  laws  would  have  to  be  based on the  facts  discovered at  each drayage
company.  Nevertheless,  once it  became clear  that  federal  preemption was  going to
prevail,  the  campaign  shifted  to  proving  that  most  owner  operators  were  indeed
dependent  on  the  drayage  companies,  not  independent  businessmen.4 (Jaffee  &
Bensman, 2016)
33 The strategy moved on two fronts. Political mobilizing and lobbying pressure achieved
success when the California state legislature revised the law defining employment and
misclassification on Sept.  8,  2011.  According to  the California  Division of  Industrial
Relations,  the  new  law  “prohibited  the  willful  misclassification  of  individuals  as
independent contractors.” It created “civil penalties of between $5000 and $25,000 per
violation,”  and  it  prohibited  charging  fees  to  or  making  deductions  from  the
compensation paid to those misclassified workers. Going further, the law provided that
“(w)orkers who do not receive minimum wages, overtime pay, or pay for meals and
breaks because their employer misclassifies them as an independent contractor can file
a wage claim with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement” (State of California,
Division of Industrial Relations, 2011) 
34 This legislation, which includes the strongest language prohibiting misclassification in
the United States, grew out of not only the alliance’s political mobilization, but also the
success  of  California’s  then-Attorney General  Jerry  Brown’s  prosecution  of  cases
involving misclassification in drayage.  In 2008,  Brown launched a series  of  lawsuits
“prosecuting  California  port  trucking  companies  for  engaging  in  employee
misclassification,  and  for  failing  to  provide  workers  with  Social  Security,  workers’
compensation,  and Medicare benefits  that  they are legally  entitled to,  according to
California state law” (Howard Law, 2010) Five successful lawsuits were filed. One suit,
filed against Pacifica Trucking, argued that “the drivers for Pacifica should have been
classified as employees, with all  of the legal benefits that employees are entitled to
under state law, and not independent contractors--as Pacifica Trucks maintained total
control over the drivers, by providing and covering the trucks, gas, equipment, and
other  employee  expenses  related  to  their  business,  including  repairs.”  California’s
Superior Court in Los Angeles County upheld Brown’s complaint, after which Brown
warned California employers “that if they cheat California workers out of their legally
entitled employee benefits according to California state law—‘we’re coming after you’”
(Howard Law, 2010 v7b) 
35 At  the  same  time  the  Coalition  was  making  progress  in  California,  the  National
Employment  Law  Project  launched  research  on  the  misclassification  of  port  truck
drivers. The work culminated in two reports -- The Big Rig (Smith, Bensman & Marvy,
2010), and a follow-up study, The Big Rig Overhaul (Smith, Marvy & Zerolnick, 2014),
documenting  how  most  port  truck  drivers  were  misclassified  as  “independent
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operators”  when they were,  according to  the relevant  labor and employment laws,
actually employees whose rights were ignored by trucking companies and government
regulatory  agencies.  The  reports  fueled  an  IBT/Change-to-Win  campaign  against
misclassification throughout the nation. In New Jersey, the campaign persuaded the
Legislature to pass a bill  revising the state’s labor and employment laws by making
explicit that formal guidelines should be used to judge whether or not port truckers
were employees. However, after the Legislature passed the bill, Gov. Christie vetoed it.
(Jaffee and Bensman, 2016) 
36 Nevertheless, the campaign against misclassification continued to rack up numerous
victories.  Between  the  dates  of  publication  of  the  two  Big  Rig  reports,  up  to  400
complaints were filed with the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement for
wage theft associated with misclassification (Smith, Marvy, & Zerolnick, 2014) In one
representative case, seven drivers working for Pacer Cartage were awarded $2.2 million
for  “unlawful  deductions,  reimbursable  business  expenses,  interest,  waiting  time
penalties  and  attorney  fees”  (TruckingInfo,  2014)  The  hearing  officer  in  the  case
declared that “The defendant considered the plaintiffs to be independent contractors;
however, the amount of control exhibited by the defendant over the plaintiffs was to
such a degree that the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiffs were
employees”  (TruckingInfo,  2014)  Further,  there  have  been  more  than  115  official
rulings  since  2011  regarding  the  misclassification  of  port  truckers,  with  state  and
federal  courts  and  agencies  concluding  that  the  port  drivers  meet  the  criteria  of
employees  rather  than  independent  contractors  (Smith,  Marvy,  &  Zerolnick,  2014;
Smith, 2015) These court rulings stimulated action by numerous state agencies against
trucking companies that use independent contractors, charging them with violations of
wage and hour standards, failure to pay income and payroll taxes, and failure to make
contributions  to  unemployment  compensation  and  worker  compensation  funds.
(Smith, Marvy & Zerolnick, 2014) In 2015, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
even opened an investigation about how it could be more rigorous in regulating work
conditions in the local drayage industry (Smith, 2015) 
37 On the federal level,  the Federal District Court for Central California reinforced the
truckers’  local  victories  on  Sept.  30,  2014,  by  rejecting  the  request  of  a  trucking
company, Shippers’ Transport Express, to dismiss a complaint filed by port truckers
citing seven causes of legal action including failure to pay minimum wage, failure to
reimburse  for  business  expenses,  unlawful  coercion,  failure  to  provide  accurate
itemized wage statements, and unfair business practices. The Court’s decision cleared
the way for Shippers’ drivers to claim their rights as employees (United States District
Court,  2014) This was followed by another legal  victory when a San Diego Superior
Court  upheld  the  $2  million  award to  employees  of  Pacer  Cartage  who had  been
“improperly misclassified as independent owner operators” (Rosenberg, 2015)
38 Emboldened by their victories in state regulatory bodies and in the courts, Southern
California port drivers have been taking labor actions aimed at organizing for collective
bargaining. In the fall of 2013, Los Angeles port drivers for Green Fleet Systems, Pac 9
Transportation and American Logistics International struck. In the spring of 2014, the
Teamsters supported a 48-hour work stoppage at LA/Long Beach by drivers for four
trucking  companies  in  order  to  address  wage  theft,  workers’  rights,  and
misclassification. They were joined by drivers at the Port of Savannah, who were also
protesting  their  status  as  independent  contractors.  The  campaign  escalated  in  the
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summer of 2014, when port drivers in LA engaged in a wider work stoppage with Pac 9
Transportation,  Green  Fleet  Services,  and  Total  Transportation  Services  that
temporarily  shut  down  three  Marine  Terminals  including  Evergreen  Container
Terminal, one of the port’s largest, as longshore workers walked off the job in support.
Unlike prior strikes, which had been scheduled to last 48 hours, this strike was open-
ended (Bradbury, 2014) Four months later, drivers struck what ultimately became eight
trucking companies. This action occurred at the same time as the shipping industry and
the  West  Coast  longshoremen’s  union,  the  ILWU,  were  in  the  midst  of  tense
negotiations,  while  containers  were  piling  up  on  the  docks.  As  a  result  of  these
coordinated actions, all eight trucking companies agreed to formal talks for resolving
the issue of misclassification (Bensman, 2014a) 
39 Together,  the  IBT/Change  to  Win  campaign’s  legal  victories,  and  its  escalating
mobilizations  bore  fruit  in  the  winter  of  2015  when  Shippers  Transport,  Inc.,
recognizing that a resounding defeat in District Court was impending, recognized its
drivers as employees. The union quickly signed up members, won recognition with an
80% vote, and bargained a contract approved by a 65-5 vote. The agreement included
an hourly wage boost of three dollars an hour, to twenty-one dollars, overtime, pay, full
medical insurance, a defined benefit pension plan, paid holiday and sick leave, and a
union grievance procedure (Rosenberg, 2015) 
40 And then the Teamsters unveiled a new strategy hoping to clinch its transformation of
drayage, in April 2015, following another strike at the southern California ports. After
the  drayage  firm  Green  Fleet  announced  that  it  would  reclassify  its  drivers  as
employees, and negotiate a contract with the Teamsters – an action that the courts had
all but forced the company to take – the Teamsters announced that L.A. Mayor Eric
Garcetti  would  hold  a  press  conference.  Surrounded  by  representatives  from  the
Teamsters  and  Change-to-Win,  and  Alex  Paz,  a  port  driver  leader,  as  well  as  by
executives of a drayage firm, the Mayor announced the formation of a new company
that would revolutionize the industry. With capital raised by a private equity firm that
owned  one  drayage  company,  Ecoflow  Transportation  would  employ  drivers,
acknowledge their right to organize, operate with a union contract, buy new trucks,
and  introduce  technological  and  operational  innovations  that  would  enable  it  to
compete with companies paying much less.  With help from the Teamsters and port
truckers fighting misclassification, Ecoflow would recruit 600 drivers during a period
when its much-smaller competitors were suffering a driver shortage. The age of wage
theft in port trucking was over, Garcetti announced. (Watt, 2015)
41 Well, not quite. Only 600 of Southern California port truckers had union contracts, out
of a fleet of more than 10,000 trucks, as of the beginning of 2017. While the campaign’s
outcome remains uncertain,  it  has demonstrated that  as  workers organize to resist
company efforts to divest themselves of the responsibilities of employment, they can
convert latent sources of power based on strategic location into progress in the courts,
in legislatures, and at bargaining tables. As unions and worker centers bring workers
together, the latter,  who often value their status as self-employed businessmen, are
becoming  more  aware  of  their  labor  rights  and  more  conscious  of  their  ability  to
disrupt  the  flow  of  commerce  (Bensman  &  Bromberg;  Bensman  2014b)  Unions’
successes  coalescing  with  environmentalists,  community  organizations,  workers’
centers,  and faith-based organizations are changing the way labor is strategizing to
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craft  public  policies  aimed at  enhancing  the  common good,  rather  than  simply  by
increasing union rights (Loomis, 2015) 
42 In Australia, working conditions in the trucking industry have been raised in recent
years after decades of decline. That story began during the Second World War, when
non-employee drivers became a significant proportion of the labor force and began
eroding the labor standards of the unionized drivers. In response, the New South Wales
Transport  Workers  Union,  “an  anomaly  among  Australian  unions  in  that  it  has
represented a variety of self-employed workers for nearly a century,” began a “long-
running  campaign  to  bring  self-employed  owner-drivers  within  the  scope  of  the
arbitration  system  in  an  attempt  to  protect  both  the  employment  conditions  of
employees and the living standards of owner-drivers” (Bray & Rimmer, 1987, p. 219, as
cited in Kaine & Rawling, 2010, pp. 187-8) From the beginning, the union’s campaign
focused on the concept that a “safe rate of pay” was necessary to ensure the health and
safety of truck drivers,  and the safety of the driving public.  By the 1960s,  a Liberal
government convened an inquiry into the relationship between work hours and road
accidents, and concluded that there was a strong case for public regulation of the work
of owner-drivers.  By the 1990s,  bipartisan public support for TWU’s legitimacy as a
spokesperson  for  these  drivers  enabled  the  union  to  negotiate  “contract
determinations” and “contract  agreements,”  even though the drivers  were still  not
employees under the nation’s labor laws. 
43 As Australia’s political system moved in a neoliberal direction, with the passage of the
Work Choices act of 2005, which “introduced anti-union statutory provisions at every
level in the regulation of the labor market,” (Kaine & Rawling, 2010, 185), the TWU’s
history  of  engaging with  and advocating  for  owner-drivers  enabled  it  to  resist  the
deregulation of the industry. In 2006, the union launched a coordinated approach to
political  organization,  public  outreach,  and  worker  organizing,  which  it  called  a
“Comprehensive Campaign.” It based its strategy on an analysis of the transportation
service chain. Union researchers analyzed a “comprehensive chain of responsibility”
that governed each of the actors governing the provision of logistics services, including
not only the local and federal government agencies, but also the various customers of
logistics services and the layers of firms that bid on and performed transport services.
Armed with this analysis, the union leaders designated a variety of targets throughout
multiple legal jurisdictions and industry segments that would need to be persuaded or
pressured to adopt higher standards for owner drivers. (Kaine & Rawling, 2010) 
44 Key  to  the  comprehensive  campaign  effort  was  the  broadcast  of  research  that
demonstrated the public stake in improving working conditions and labor standards
for truckers. Led by Michael Quinlan, a scholar at the University of New South Wales
School  of  Management,  researchers  documented that  “trucking remains  one of  the
most dangerous occupations” and found that “excessive hours of  work,  fatigue and
other dangerous work practices partly result from the lack of client responsibility for
driver hours, performance and remuneration.” (Quinlan, 2001, 17-22, as cited in Kaine
& Rawling,  191)  The report  argued that  at  the core of  the problem was the strong
bargaining position that clients, such as large retail chains, deployed to cut the rates
charged by truck drivers and the working conditions under which they hauled freight.
(Kaine & Rawling,  2010)  To bolster  this  argument,  the Quinlan Report  drew on the
research of the American scholar, Michael Belzer, whose work on the negative impact
of trucking deregulation on the rates paid to truck drivers (Belzer, 2000) led him to
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argue that the only way to improve trucking safety was to set minimum rates. (Quinlan,
2001) 
45 The findings of the Quinlan report provided the basis for The Occupational Health and
Safety Amendment (Long Distance Truck Driver Fatigue) Regulation 2005 (NSW) This
legislation placed responsibility not only on the companies that put drivers to work to
ensure that their driving conditions would not lead to fatigue and unsafe practices; it
also placed responsibility on the clients who contracted with the trucking companies to
ensure safe conditions. Moreover, New South Wales regulators went further, drawing
upon the Quinlan Report to argue that the entire system of putting owner operators to
work undermined the sustainability of healthy work practices. Therefore, regulators
required transport providers to develop safe driving plans to make sure that drivers
were paid sufficiently so that they would not work excess hours, or unsafe schedules
and routes. These plans included limits on hours on the road, rest breaks, meal breaks
and sleep breaks. (Kaine & Rawling, 2010) Quinlan’s report also argued the need for
government to set rates for truckers to ensure road safety. (Quinlan, 2001) Five years
later, this recommendation was at the center of the TWU’s Comprehensive Campaign. 
46 Expert research was not sufficient for the union to win these improved labor standards,
however. The comprehensive campaign included several related efforts. First, drivers
were encouraged to write letters to local politicians and local media explaining why
they needed regulatory protection. Second, the union trained thousands of its members
about its Safe Rates strategy, so that they could participate effectively. Third, the union
drew on its educated members to make the case to trucking companies that there was a
strong business case for strong regulation. This campaign helped the union to increase
its membership substantially as it pressed for improved standards. Fourth, the union
mobilized its members to participate in community forums and political gatherings at
the local levels to argue that improved working conditions for drivers would benefit
families by reducing road accidents and improve highway safety. TWU also gave its
members  responsibility  for  conducting  lobbying  and  presenting  testimony  to
legislative  and  regulatory  bodies.  Finally,  union  leaders  created  enforcement
committees  which  activated  union  members,  and  built  up  the  union  presence  in
workplaces  where  managers  had  previously  succeeded  in  minimizing  the  union
presence. Involvement in safety enforcement augmented the union’s role; not only was
it bargaining over workplace rules, it created increasing legitimacy for its role in the
workplace as a guarantor of worker oversight of work practices. The union’s organizing
success bore fruit as it maintained and expanded a “protective regulatory system for
owner-drivers.” (Kaine & Rawling, 2010, p. 193) 
47 In 2012, TWU secured passage of the Road Safety Remuneration Act. The legislation
created a tribunal to monitor pay and conditions in the trucking industry with the
power  to  set  safe  rates  of  pay  for  both  employee  and  contractor  drivers,  resolve
disputes and conduct inquiries, and issue orders to remove commercial incentives that
promote unsafe work including industry practices for loading and unloading vehicles,
waiting times, working hours, load limits and payment methods. (Rawling and Kaine,
2012)  Central  to  the  new regulatory  regime was the  notion that  all  the  companies
involved in subcontracted movement of freight were responsible for the conditions of
the drivers who actually hauled that freight. The union called this principle the “Chain
of  Responsibility,”  and  pressed  to  embed it  in  the  nation’s  regulatory  system.  The
national regulatory tribunal established in 2012 to set “safe rates” for truck drivers
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accepted the Chain of Responsibility principle, and began investigating the companies
hauling  freight  to  and  from  Australia’s  ports  in  order  to  determine  if  intense
competition was causing drivers to work excessive, unsafe hours at low rates of pay.
(Web safety hub, 2015) Before the Tribunal could issue its report, it was abolished by a
newly-elected national government. (Thornewaite & O’Neill, 2016) 
48 As a result of the TWU’s comprehensive campaign, truckers made many gains up until
2016. For one thing, many of them now belong to a section of the Transport Workers’
Union.  The  union and its  broad spectrum of  allies  were  able  to  pass  legislation  to
protect  truckers’  rights,  raise  working  standards  and  regulation,  and  enforce  road
safety.  Their  union  has  many  trained  members  who  act  to  enforce  the  bargaining
agreements and to ensure that laws and regulations are followed. Accidents have been
reduced and working conditions  and pay to  have improved for  many thousands of
drivers. This progress was brought to a halt after a new conservative government was
elected in September 2013. Amid fierce controversy, the Road Safety Remuneration Act
was  repealed  and  the  Tribunal  it  had  established  was  disbanded  in  April,  2016.
(Thornwaite & O’Neill, 2016) 
49 In their 2016 review of the accomplishments and shortcomings of the effort to improve
trucking safety in Australia, Thornwaite and O’Neill found: 
“there is  a  substantial  degree of  regulatory compliance in  the Australian heavy
vehicle road transport industry. Almost every driver has undergone some form of
WHS training at least once in their career, and most drivers have experienced safe
practices at large loading and unloading docks, safe scheduling and management
commitment  to  safe  work  systems.  At  the  same  time,  however  …  a  significant
proportion  of  drivers  report  that  scheduling  arrangements  and  workplaces  at
which they (un)load remain unsafe. There also appears to be a widespread view
among drivers that employers and other parties in the CoR (Chain of Responsibility)
are more concerned with the appearance of compliance than entrenching safe work
practices. While the results confirm that some companies are actively working to
ensure the health and safety of their (drivers), it has also established that there is a
substantial  segment  of  truck  drivers  that  effectively  forms  an  underclass  of
neglected drivers in the industry. For this group, management lacks an effective
commitment to health and safety. The survey revealed that a substantial number of
owners  and  employee  drivers  share  similarly  poor  safety  conditions  at  work,
characterised  by  unsafe  loading  sites,  unsafe  schedules,  unsafe  loads,  a  lack  of
remuneration for work activities other than driving and longer working hours than
other drivers. Common to these drivers is an almost complete dependence on one
employer, contractor or client which renders them vulnerable and consequently,
also, unable to report to a third party when their employer, contractor or major
client breaches WHS laws and other regulations. Retribution culture in the industry
exacerbates this vulnerability, reinforcing the reluctance of drivers to complain.”
(Thornwaite & O’Neill, 2016, pp. 112-3.)
50 In  Europe,  after  EU-mandated  liberalization  of  road  transport reduced  drivers’
compensation  and  caused  their  working  conditions  to  decline,  especially  in
transnational  transport.  National  transport  unions  began  to  press  for  a  European
Union-wide policy. At its 2014 Congress, the International Transport Federation (ITF)
adopted the Australian Transport Workers’ Union program to legislate “safe rates” and
European unions began organizing truckers based on the idea that road safety depends
on drivers receiving adequate compensation so that they don’t have to drive excessive
hours  or  to  take  imprudent  risks.  (ITF,  2014)  An  outstanding  example  is  the  joint
organizing  campaign  by  the  Dutch  transport  union  (FNV)  and  the  Polish  union
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Solidarnosc,  which  succeeded  in  organizing  400  Polish  truck  drivers  who  were
delivering potatoes from Poland to the Netherlands on a subcontracted basis (ITF, 2016)
51 On a regional level, the European Transport Federation, which is the body representing
ITF’s European affiliates, launched a petition in 2015 seeking one million signatures,
calling  on  the  European  Commission  to  halt  low  rates  and  “social  dumping”  in
transport. Under the name of the European Citizen Initiative for a Fair Transport, the
ETF began garnering public support for safe rates and decent work for truck drivers.
(ETF, 2015)
52 Furthermore,  in  October  2015,  the  campaign to  restore  workers’  standards  in  road
transport reached a global scale, when the ILO convened a Tripartite Sectoral Meeting
on Road Safety in the Road Transport Sector. At the meeting, the representative of the
International Transport Federation called on the ILO to enact an international labor
standards  approach  to  the  global  road  transport  sector.  He  pointed  to  the  ILO’s
adoption of a Maritime Labour Convention, which went into effect in 2013, “to make a
real difference for seafarers.” Then he suggested that “the freight sector could follow
examples like the Safe Rates campaign in Australia, which demands that clients at the
top of the supply chain are responsible for workers in their supply chain regardless of
their employment relationship. (ILO, 2015a, p. 7)
53 While  the  Tripartite  Sectoral  Meeting  did  not  specifically  endorse  the  Safe  Rates
approach, its conclusions mirrored the analysis of Belzer and Quinlan on the chain of
responsibility that provided the foundation for the Safe Rates program. For example, it
stated that:
Level playing fields are being destabilized by a number of factors. In some regions,
illegal and informal operations put an additional stress on transport undertakings
that play by the rules. Transport workers temporarily working in other countries,
including from lower-income countries, may be victims of exploitative conditions,
which  are  not  only  detrimental  to  themselves  but  can  also  lead  to  unfair
competition and illegal international operations. Market pressures have impacted
social dialogue, collective bargaining, wages and working conditions in the sector.
Other supply chain actors outside the transport chain and not direct employers can
set logistics and just-in-time requirements both in passenger and freight transport
that  strongly  impact  the  industry,  and  can  lead  to  unsafe  and  unsustainable
practices. (ILO, 2015c, p. 2) 
54 Furthermore, The Tripartite Sectoral Meeting adopted a resolution which invited the
governing  body  to  request the  International  Labour  Office  to:  “conduct  further
research  in  consultation  with  tripartite  experts  in  the  sector  on  best  practices
including on the Safe Rates model.” (ILO, 2015b, p. 2)
 
Conclusion
55 As  global  trade  grew  in  the  neoliberal  era,  transnational  corporations  constructed
global supply chains to capture as much of the wealth generated by global trade as
possible. The lead firms that ship freight along those chains, Wal-Mart, Ikea, Carrefour,
and Amazon, for example, have gained dominance over the road freight companies that
transport goods from factories to seaports, from seaports to distribution centers, and
from  distribution  centers  to  retail  stores.  In  the  United  States,  Australia,  and  the
European Union, this restructuring of power relations has created competitive markets
where trucking companies  and track drivers  must  accept  the shippers’  terms.  As  a
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result,  labor  unions  have  lost  power,  many  workers  have  been  forced  to  work  as
contractors  without  the  protection  of  labor  and  employment  laws,  and  working
conditions  have  deteriorated.  This  common  path  to  a  grey  zone  of  work  and
employment relations in the road freight transport sector supports the theory that
labor and employment systems are converging, as Baccaro and Howell, Standing, and
Streeck have argued.5 
56 In response to the fact that large shippers have gained dominance over small trucking
firms,  the  road  freight  transport  industry  itself  is  undergoing  changes  that  are
transforming it into an increasingly global industry. The Toll Group, one of Australia’s
largest trucking firms, has become a global logistics network, running logistics services,
drayage, and warehousing throughout the world. XPO is not only a drayage firm in
Southern California; it purchased a less-than-truckload company operating in the US
and  Canada,  and  also  acquired  one  of  France’s  largest  road  transport  firms.  The
expansion of  trucking firms into global  logistics  service providers  has  labor unions
thinking about global coordination.
57 Recognizing  that  the  trucking  companies  that  emerged  after  the  industry  was
deregulated exist on thin margins, unions in all three regions have launched campaigns
to restore decent working conditions and labor rights by targeting the public interest
rather than the individual trucking firms. The Teamsters’ port trucking campaign in
the United States stressed the connection between the misclassification of truck drivers
and the public concern for reduced diesel emissions and cleaner air. The Australian
Transport Workers’ Union’s comprehensive campaign linked labor standards to road
safety. The campaign for regional governance of road transport in the European Union
is also based on the link between working conditions and public safety. Drawing on the
experiences of these union campaigns to restore labor standards in road transport, the
International  Labor  Organization  has  begun  exploring  how  to  create  decent  global
work  standards  for  the  road  transport  industry,  as  it  has  already  begun to  do  for
seafaring. (Lillie, 2006) 
58 In conclusion, the struggle to restore decent work to the drayage and long-haul freight
transport  industries  is  changing  as  the  global  freight  movement  industry  changes.
Unions are increasingly adopting strategies that connect workers’ rights to the public
interest in clean air and road safety, and they are broadening their struggle to regional
and global levels. Whether or not such strategies are sufficient to meet the challenges
posed by the ongoing restructuring of the global freight movement industry is far from
certain. 
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NOTES
1.  In  the  United  States  and  Canada,  port  trucking  is  a  distinct  sector.  Most  containers  are
delivered by drivers, who exclusively work in this sector. In the rest of the world, truck drivers
sometimes drive trucks carrying containers to and from ports, and at other times drive trucks
with trailers over the road for long distances. This paper will compare port trucking in the US
with the broader  trucking industry  in  Europe and Australia.  Williamson,  Bohle,  Quinlan and
Kennedy discuss paucity of research on short-haul trucking, 2009) 
2.  Similar changes have occurred in South Korea, but information in English on these changes
are limited. (Yun, 2014)
3.  While  the  employee  mandate  died,  the  Clean  Truck  Program  did  succeed  in  forcing  the
Southern California drayage industry into replacing its trucking fleet with vehicles complaint
with 2007 federal emission standards. 
4.  The overwhelming majority of drivers are male. 
5.  (Baccaro & Howell, 2011; Standing, 2011, 2014; Streeck, 2016)
ABSTRACTS
The work status and working conditions of truckers in the road freight transport industry in the
United States, Australia, and the European Union as the industry have been deregulated in the
face of  the expansion of  global  trade.  In all  three regions,  the construction of  global  supply
chains has given big shippers,  usually retailers,  dominant power in relation to the transport
companies that deliver their freight from factories to seaports,  from seaports to distribution
centers, and from distribution centers to retail stores. Trucking companies are forced to accept
the terms dictated by the large shippers; in response, they subcontract the work, force their
drivers  to  work  as  contractors  without  labor  and  employment  rights,  and/or  reduce
compensation while intensifying work requirements. In all three regions, unions are mounting
campaigns  to  restore  workers’  rights  and  working  standards.  In  the  US,  the  International
Brotherhood of Teamsters is organizing port truck drivers through a campaign that links the
misclassification of the drivers to the public concern for clean air. In Australia, the Transport
Workers’  Union  has  mounted  a  comprehensive  campaign  to  mobilize  members  to  push  for
legislation that would raise drivers’ rates and enhance public road safety. In the EU, unions are
pushing for the region-wide standards in road freight transport, and have adopted the Australian
“Safe Rates” program as a model. The economic trends and labor campaigns reflect that as the
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freight transport sector globalizes, work and employment relations in nations around the world
are converging into a “grey zone” where the rights of workers, be they employees or contractors,
are ambiguous, contradictory, and/or contested. 
Le statut et les conditions de travail des camionneurs de l’industrie du fret aux États-Unis, en
Australie et dans l’Union européenne ont connu une dérégulation avec l’expansion du commerce
global. Dans les trois régions, la construction de chaînes de valeur globales a donné aux grands
armateurs,  généralement  détaillants,  un  pouvoir  dominant  par  rapport  aux  compagnies  qui
assurent le fret des usines aux ports, des ports aux centres de distribution et de ces derniers aux
magasins de détail. Les compagnies de camionnage sont forcées d’accepter les termes dictés par
les  grands  expéditeurs,  en  guise  de  réponse  elles  sous-traitent  le  travail,  forcent  leurs
camionneurs à travailler en régime de sous-traitance sans droits du travail ou protections liées à
l’emploi, et/ou elles réduisent les indemnisations tout en intensifiant leurs exigences en termes
de travail. Dans les trois régions, les syndicats mènent des campagnes pour restaurer les droits
des  travailleurs  et  les  standards  de  travail.  Aux  États-Unis,  la  Confrérie  internationale  des
camionneurs organise les camionneurs du port à travers une campagne qui fait un lien entre
l’erreur de classification des camionneurs à la préoccupation publique pour un air propre. En
Australie, le syndicat des travailleurs du transport a monté une campagne visant à mobiliser ses
membres pour mettre en place une législation qui élèverait les taux de salaire des camionneurs
et renforcerait la sécurité sur les routes publiques. Dans l’Union européenne, les syndicats luttent
pour l’obtention de standards régionaux pour le transport de fret et ils ont fait du programme
australien de « Taux surs » un modèle. Les tendances économiques et les campagnes en faveur du
travail reflètent le fait que, alors que le secteur du transport de fret se globalise, les relations de
travail et d’emploi dans le monde entier les nations convergent vers une « zone grise » où les
droits des travailleurs, qu’ils soient employés ou sous-traitants sont ambigus, contradictoires et/
ou contestés.
INDEX
Mots-clés: camionnage, contrat indépendant, erreur de classification, travail précaire
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